

# GIS Will Form Strategic Reserve

## Limits of Latest U.S. Commitment Still Not in Sight

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## *News Analysis*

The minimum additional army units or as combat pilots.

take a combat role against Viet Cong guerrillas—as opposed to their hard-core reg.

problem that now faces the President.

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tions of the latest U.S. commitment in Viet-Nam are still not in sight.

What the State Department's announcement means is that U.S. combat

20,000 additional American combat troops.

reinforcement that must now be expected, some 20,000 additional combat troops, would bring this total to about 70,000.

Essentially Defensive  
In this sense the latest  
ular units—there is no sign  
of sentiment in that direc-  
tion among the senior civil-  
ians in the Administration.

No one knows how well the shaky South Vietnamese government is going to survive the dissension among the loyalists that has been so apparent for several weeks. And no one knows

troops established at half a dozen enclaves along the South Vietnamese coast.

modest losses accepted to date.

go badly, as they plainly are now, a commitment of 100,000 or more Americans

U.S. commitment remains limited and essentially defensive in nature.

how the Administration will react to the inevitable domestic pressures to escalate the war against the

can now be considered as strategic reserve to the South Vietnamese army, available for commitment to pitched battles against hard-core Viet Cong units.

Vienna's many-season circuit  
turns out to be even  
stronger than the minimum  
that must now prudently  
be anticipated, the Admini-  
stration will soon be faced,  
if it is not already faced,  
with even more painful deci-

may come to seem unavoidable. The objective of this American commitment is reasonably clear: It is to defeat a Viet Cong attempt to move their revolution into

The problem of how limited that commitment can remain on the progress of the Viet Cong's summer offensive. Some of the imponderables involved there are

North still more, with the implication of a major confrontation with the Russians, as American casualties mount.

The Administration is worried about all these things,

What it portends for the future is harder to judge. It is almost certainly true that no one in the United States Government could answer that question. At a minimum — and it can be assumed that it is this minimum that the Administration hopes will be sufficient — it probably implies commitment to Viet-Nam of something like

sions to commit even larger contingents of American troops to the war.

Present American troop strength in Viet-Nam was reported yesterday as 51,000 of whom nearly 20,000 are combat troops such as the Marines assigned to the Danang complex, and of whom many more are exposed to combat as individual advisers to South Vietnamese

large-scale open combat with the South Vietnamese regular army. It is in this phase of essentially conventional combat operations that U.S. troops are likely to be most effective, and it is in this role that they are needed. Although there is sentiment in the military for American troops to under-

how strong the Viet Cong really are, how far Hanoi will go in introducing, as it will, substantial numbers of native North Vietnamese regulars into the south, and how well the South Vietnamese regular army will fare in relatively large-scale open combat with hardcore, well-armed Viet Cong units.

most of all because it is no more sure than the public quite what they are all lead-  
ing to.